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ABSTRACT The UAV is emerging as one of the greatest technology developments for rapid network 
coverage provisioning at affordable cost. The aim of this paper is to outsource network coverage of a specific 
area according to a desired quality of service requirement and to enable various entities in the network to 
have intelligence to make autonomous decisions using blockchain and auction mechanisms. In this regard, 
by considering a multiple-UAV network where each UAV is associated to its own controlling operator, 
this paper addresses two major challenges: the selection of the UAV for the desired quality of network 
coverage and the development of a distributed and autonomous real-time monitoring framework for the 
enforcement of service level agreement (SLA). For a suitable UAV selection, we employ a reputation-based 
auction mechanism to model the interaction between the business agent who is interested in outsourcing 
the network coverage and the UAV operators serving in closeby areas. In addition, theoretical analysis is 
performed to show that the proposed auction mechanism attains a dominant strategy equilibrium. For the SLA 
enforcement and trust model, we propose a permissioned blockchain architecture considering Support Vector 
Machine (SVM) for real-time autonomous and distributed monitoring of UAV service. In particular, smart 
contract features of the blockchain are invoked for enforcing the SLA terms of payment and penalty, and for 
quantifying the UAV service reputation. Simulation results confirm the accuracy of theoretical analysis and 
efficacy of the proposed model. 
INDEX TERMS Blockchain, auction, support vector machine, service level agreement, unmanned aerial 
vehicles, ergodic capacity. 
I. INTRODUCTION Applications also include military, security, medicine, disas-
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have the potential to boost ter management, structural inspection, and traffic-monitoring 
capacity and coverage of existing cellular networks [1]. applications [5], [6]. The rapid growth of UAV technology 
In particular, UAVs can be deployed as aerial base stations to coupled with its flexibility of deployment and connectivity is 
support wireless communications and internet of things (IoT) creating promising new business opportunities and potential 
in various scenarios such as remote areas [2], emergency situ- for generating significant revenue for cellular operators [7]. 
ations [3], sports events, and festivals where the installation of Besides the fact that the deployment of UAVs offers numer-
terrestrial base stations is too expensive if not impossible [4]. ous advantages, there are still many technical and economic 
challenges that need to be addressed, while adhering to 
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and national security and public safety regulations and guidelines 
approving it for publication was Essam A. Rashed . as stipulated in for example [8], [9]. The main challenges are 
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not limited to the technological aspects of UAV deployment 
but should include the economical aspect and trustworthiness 
of UAV operators. For example, there may exist malicious 
UAV operators that can misbehave and provide inadequate 
service which could compromise the advantages of adopting 
UAV-based services. Therefore, ignoring a UAV operator’s 
track record of service provisioning can leave the customer 
in a vulnerable position. This is known as soft security threat, 
which is mainly addressed by adopting a trust and reputation 
model [10]. For example, recently an innovative blockchain 
based reputation system has been proposed to encourage 
participants’ good behavior to improve market quality for 
trading in [11]. 
In addition to achieve reliability, a proper mechanism of 
operator selection is important for reasonable cost of service. 
Absence of a proper mechanism for example organizing a 
competitive selection process, could lead the UAV operators 
to be untruthful for seeking profits at the expense of internal 
standards of service, which may cause a customer to pay high 
service cost. In this regard, economic models and pricing 
using game theory and auctioning have been extensively 
analyzed to address resource allocation and various security 
issues in wireless network [12], [13]. In particular, auction 
is considered as a well known strategy to ensure fairness, 
efficiency and truthfulness, specifically, if the participants 
are rational, intelligent and competing [14]–[17]. Vickrey 
auction is one of the well-known auction mechanisms due 
to its unbiased and truthful enforcement nature, where bid-
ding truthfully is the only dominant strategy for the bidders 
[18], [19]. It is simple to implement yet can provide an effec-
tive platform for the distributed and decentralized competitive 
market. In this context, auction was proposed in [20], [21] as 
a solution for decentralized users’ offloading in a heteroge-
neous cellular network. Moreover, auction was studied in [22] 
for spectrum trading between two different cellular service 
providers as a solution to achieve maximum trading fairness. 
In the context of outsourcing services, the trading between 
the involved parties must be mediated by a service level 
agreement (SLA) [23]. It provides a clear understanding of 
responsibilities and requirements which eliminate the risk 
of disputes. Thus, SLA is considered as an essential part of 
the trading relationship. However, contracting through SLA 
opens various challenges to performance measurement. For 
example, without a proper mechanism of service monitoring, 
there is a possibility of opportunistic behavior of service in 
terms of not providing adequate services during the con-
tract duration. In order to address this issue and to ensure 
accountability of violations against quality of service (QoS) 
provisioning, regular tracking and periodic monitoring (test-
ing) of service quality is a key characteristic of performance 
measurement. Monitoring plays a major role in determining 
whether the SLA has been violated, and thereby facilitates the 
penalty terms that must be invoked as a consequence. In this 
context, machine learning, in particular the support vector 
machine (SVM) [24] is considered as one of the powerful 
tools for real time monitoring of QoS provisioning [25]. 
Due to its distributed, transparent, trust-free and highly 
secure nature, Blockchain technology [26], [27] has attracted 
tremendous interest in many disciplines including those in 
finance [28], healthcare [29], transportation [30], energy sec-
tor [31], and defense [32]. It is mainly employed for trans-
parency, integrity of the information, processing of claims, 
auditing of operations, identity management, and to address 
the threat of malicious entities. In particular, blockchain can 
enable decentralized operation without a need of trusted 
central authority. Tempering of information is extremely 
challenging due to the use of highly cryptographic data 
structure [33]. More importantly, smart contract features 
of blockchains deployment of applications over mutually 
distrusting nodes without the need for an external trusted 
authority. For example, smart contracts automatically enforce 
the blockchain systems to only validate the transactions 
that take place under the condition of agreed upon terms. 
This makes blockchains act vigorously for resolving issues 
related to lack of trust, which conventionally require a central 
trusted party [34]–[37]. Recent years have also witnessed 
a growing research trend on the application of blockchains 
in UAV-enabled businesses for solving many critical chal-
lenges [38], [39]. For instance, blockchain has been proposed 
to enable commercial operators to share real time flight plans 
and establish high quality of audit. Blockchain-enabled sys-
tems can assign a unique digital identity to every UAVs and 
could maintain a record of their airspace activities and related 
information such as maintenance history and their operators. 
This allows the regulators to control the operations of UAVs, 
track missions and identify malicious activities [40]. Further-
more, the blockchain could enable the UAVs to directly inter-
act with each other, share resources and make decisions about 
their actions through peer-to-peer networking [41], [42]. 
Fascinatingly, blockchain could introduce new business mod-
els in UAV market, where UAVs can directly perform trading 
activities not only with other UAVs but also with human users 
in exchange of their services [43]. Blockchain has also found 
in various UAV assisted applications including data security 
and resource allocations in wireless networks [44]–[46]. For 
instance, it has been proposed in [47] and [48] for the secu-
rity of UAV based data acquisition system in IoT networks. 
Blockchain has been proposed in [49] for achieving privacy 
preserving secure spectrum trading in UAV assisted cellular 
networks. It has also been proposed for conducting secure and 
distributed auctioning to address the economic challenges of 
resource allocation in both heterogeneous and co-operative 
wireless networks [50], [21]. Moreover, blockchain has been 
applied for the security of UAV assisted health monitor-
ing in [51]. However, none of these works have considered 
selection criterion of UAV operator and the monitoring pro-
cess of its service provisioning. By exploiting the intrinsic 
amalgam of auction based game theory, machine learning 
and blockchain, we have proposed a novel framework for 
autonomous selection and operation of UAV for network 
coverage. The auction framework allows automatic trading 
for selecting a low-cost UAV while the machine learning and 
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blockchain technology facilitate real-time monitoring of trust 
and SLA management. Particularly, the proposed framework 
not only maintains immutable and secure log of UAV’s ser-
vice provisioning but also establishes a fair reputation mech-
anism of UAV operators in an autonomous and distributed 
manner. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study 
that jointly considers machine learning, blockchain and game 
theory for autonomous selection of UAV, its real-time service 
monitoring and SLA management in wireless networks. 
The key motivations of this work are twofold: 
(i) To propose an incentive mechanism that jointly addresses 
the problem of UAV selection for low cost network outsourc-
ing and the problem of adverse selection of a UAV operator; 
and (ii) To build a novel blockchain architecture that relies 
on machine learning technique to monitor and penalize UAVs 
who violate SLAs. To the best of our knowledge, this work 
represents the first attempt to present a holistic framework 
that addresses the problem of UAV-based network outsourc-
ing and its compliance enforcement. The main contributions 
are summarized as follows: 
1) Theoretical expression that evaluates the channel 
ergodic capacity over a specific UAV coverage area 
where users (or IoT devices) are randomly distributed 
according to Binomial Point Process (BPP) is derived. 
And a resource allocation model is proposed to deter-
mine the minimum power required for a UAV to pro-
vide a specific QoS over the desired coverage area. 
2) Reputation based truthful auction mechanism is pro-
posed to model the interaction between UAV operators 
and a business agent, where the business agent is inter-
ested in outsourcing the network coverage of a specific 
area, while the UAV operators sell their service based 
on their cost. 
3) A framework is proposed that integrates the benefits of 
both the blockchain and SVM-based machine learning 
techniques for SLA enforcement and for the develop-
ment of service reputation based trust model. 
4) Extensive simulations are conducted to verify the accu-
racy of the analytical expressions for resource alloca-
tions, and to demonstrate the efficacy of the reputation 
based system. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II 
describes the system model and problem statement. 
Section III presents a high level architecture environment and 
summarizes the considered model. Theoretical expressions 
for the ergodic channel capacity of the ground users are 
derived in Section IV and the proposed resource allocation 
model and auction mechanism are presented. Blockchain pre-
liminaries are presented in Section V and a detailed descrip-
tion of the proposed blockchain framework is presented in 
Section VI. Results are discussed in Section VII followed by 
conclusions in Section VIII. 
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Consider a group of users (or IoT devices) located in a 
remote geographical area, which is outside the coverage of 
FIGURE 1. A UAV located at O(xi , yi , H) intends to serve two pockets of 
areas - region Ei of its existing service area and region D of new service 
area in order to earn profit out of its extra resources. 
ground BSs. All the users or IoT devices are randomly dis-
tributed in a circular disc D of radius RD according to the 
BPP as shown in Fig. 1. There is a set of nu UAVs distributed 
randomly according to a uniform distribution, near to D at an 
altitude H . One of the UAVs is expected to provide network 
coverage to users in D. Fig. 1 depicts UAV i that has its own 
users in area Ei, but located optimally at O(xi, yi, H ) to serve 
users in both the areas Ei and D. The optimal location and 
power needed will be computed based on the QoS require-
ment as explained in Section IV. Each UAV could belong to 
a different cellular operator or service provider. We assume 
that there is always a backhaul connection between a UAV 
and its corresponding ground BS. Furthermore, each UAV 
communicates through an orthogonal frequency band, such 
that there is no interference between UAV transmissions. 
We consider that there is a third party business agent inter-
ested in outsourcing network coverage of D to one of the UAV 
operators through auctioning. The business agent could be the 
network operator for users in D or its representative that can 
be contacted by UAV operators who are willing to provide 
network service for remuneration. During auctioning, the ser-
vice requirement and network scenario, such as the location 
and the radius of coverage area D, the number of users nD 
and their target QoS in terms of minimum ergodic data rate τD 
will be announced by the auctioneer/business agent. Based on 
this requirement, a number of UAV operators already serving 
in the neighborhood would compute the cost of providing 
service to the users/IoT devices in D based on the additional 
transmission power and submit their bids. The winner UAV 
operator will be expected to provide network coverage as per 
a service level agreement that specifies a certain quality of 
service based on the payment, which the business agent needs 
to pay if the agreement has been fulfilled. 
It is important for the UAV to maintain adequate QoS 
in order to ensure users’ satisfaction. Without a proper 
mechanism for SLA monitoring, various malicious activities 
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A. S. Khan et al.: Trusted UAV Network Coverage 
could manifest. For example, a selfish UAV operator can 
cheat and misbehave for increasing his revenue by not pro-
viding the agreed level of service in terms of QoS, i.e., not 
transmitting signals with adequate power to users/IoT devices 
to achieve the desired data rate τD. On the other hand, while 
anticipating this behavior, a rational business agent will not 
necessarily trust the UAV operator and will pay less than the 
agreed amount. 
Traditionally, SLA can be monitored through a central-
ized third-party agent or soliciting users’ feedback. However, 
monitoring through a central agent may not be technically 
feasible. In addition, since the agent is given a complete 
authority of decision making, it can also cheat for his own 
benefits. For example, the agent can be bribed by either 
service provider or customers for positive reporting and 
favourable outcomes. On the other hand, monitoring through 
soliciting users’ feedback is also vulnerable to deception and 
collusion. For example, the malicious soliciting users may 
collude and provide false information in order to decrease 
the reputation of the service provider or may intend to pay 
fewer than negotiated amount. Moreover, in case of SLA 
violation, there is a lack of mechanism for penalty enforce-
ment. For example, traditionally a responsible party can-
not be charged any penalty if it does not acknowledge any 
violation. This creates a lack of trust between the parties, 
and would undermine efficient operation of the systems. 
Thus, in order to address the aforementioned SLA compli-
ance issues, blockchain and machine learning technologies 
are considered for distributed monitoring mechanism, and 
guaranteeing trust-free and autonomous SLA monitoring and 
service reputation system. 
III. HIGH LEVEL ARCHITECTURE ENVIRONMENT 
The high level architecture of the considered model is 
depicted in Fig. 2, comprising three main components includ-
ing: a business agent, UAV service providers, and blockchain 
service. There are two layers. The first layer has a number of 
UAVs that are willing to provide network coverage to users 
in D of Fig. 1. There is a business agent that acts as an 
auctioneer and selects the winning UAV for service provision. 
The layer 1 is also responsible for conducting negotiations 
(about the payments, service duration, QoS requirements, and 
terms and conditions of penalty) between the business agent 
and the selected UAV operator. After the negotiation, SLA is 
signed between the two parties as a contractual agreement. 
This SLA is then passed to the second layer which contains a 
blockchain network, where it is deployed as a smart contract. 
For the case of serving IoT devices, we have considered that 
there are fully functional nodes among the IoT devices which 
have adequate computing and storage power. These func-
tional nodes can fully support blockchain protocols and are 
selected by blockchain administration considering permis-
sioned Blockchain. This blockchain network is responsible 
for QoS monitoring and SLA compliance enforcement. For 
example, the blockchain ensures that the QoS at the coverage 
area is satisfied as per SLA, and the payment is correctly 
FIGURE 2. High level architecture environment. 
made to the UAV operator. In this regard, the blockchain 
keeps a record of QoS provisioning. It identifies SLA vio-
lations if the QoS requirement at any point of the coverage 
area is not satisfied, and enforces UAV operator to pay the 
penalty as a compensation of violations. In addition, based 
on the statistics of QoS provisioning the blockchain network 
is also enabled to evaluate the reputation of UAV operator, 
and to share it with the business agent as a feedback for 
future agreements. The rest of this paper presents the key 
functionality of both the layers. In particular, correspond-
ing to layer 1, wireless model of the network is analyzed, 
and an auction mechanism for suitable interaction between 
the business agent and the UAV operators is presented in 
Section IV. Section VI focuses on layer 2 in terms of the 
development of blockchain for SLA monitoring as well as the 
establishment of reputation system about the service provider 
(UAV operators). 
IV. WIRELESS MODEL AND AUCTIONING 
The cost of a UAV to provide a specific service (data rate 
over certain duration) depends on the transmission power, 
bandwidth and other operational costs. Once a business agent 
announced the service requirement such as QoS and the 
coverage area, a UAV operator needs to determine the cost 
of providing the services and submit a bid for the auction. 
Hence, a UAV needs to include all the operational costs 
including the bandwidth requirement. We consider all the 
costs excluding the transmission power as a pre-determined 
fixed cost to the UAV operators and the transmission power as 
a time-varying cost that would depend on the locations of the 
serving UAV and the users/IoT devices. As shown later, due to 
the truthfulness of the Vickery auction mechanism, the UAV 
operators will be submitting the real cost incurred to them 
as their bids. This cost is likely to be identical for all UAV 
operators except for the transmission power which depends 
on the location of the serving UAV. Hence, in this section, 
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we characterize the transmission power required for a UAV 
to satisfy the target data rate τD for each users/IoT devices. 
We analytically quantify the ergodic capacity of the link 
connecting a UAV at an arbitrary location and a ground user 
placed randomly according to BPP within the coverage area 
D as shown in Fig. 1. As discussed in Section II, we assume 
that each UAV i is already serving its own host users located 
in a disc Ei of radius REi . Hence, in order to optimize the 
transmission power, UAV i will be expected to move from its 
current location (center of disk Ei) towards center of disk D. 
Thus, the derived ergodic capacity equations will be used 
for determining the optimum location (O(xi, yi, H ) as shown 
in Fig. 1) for the UAV in terms of minimizing the required 
transmission power for serving the existing users in Ei and 
the new users in D. 
In order to evaluate the ergodic capacity at Ei correspond-
ing to UAV i, let us first consider a point A over Ei. Assume 
UAV i is located at (xi, yi, H ), where xi and yi represent the 
x-axis and y-axis locations from a global referencing point 
O¯(0, 0, H ) with H being its altitude. Similarly, the center of 
Ei can be represented as O(xˆi, yˆi, 0), such that xˆi and yˆi are 
the x-axis and y-axis locations of O(xˆi, yˆi, 0) from the origin 
(0, 0, 0) ∈ R3. The air-to-ground link normally considers 
the path-loss rather than the small scale fading [1], therefore, 
the path loss model in this paper is assumed as λ−α , where Ai 
α ∈ (2, 7) is the path loss exponent, and λAi is the distance 
between the ith UAV and an arbitrary point A in disk Ei. Let p
ri = (xi − xˆi)2 + (yi − yˆi)2 is the Euclidean distance in the 
two dimensional plane between the UAV and the center of 
Ei. The distance M between the UAV and the point A can be 
evaluated as: q
2M = ri + `2 − 2ri` cos θ, (1) 
where ` is the Euclidean distance between A and O(xˆi, yˆi, 0) 
and θ is the angle of its elevation. Thus, λAi is equal to: p
λAi = M2 + H2 q
= r2 + `2 − 2ri` cos θ + H2 . (2)i 
When the ith UAV transmits a signal xui (n) at any time instant 
n with power PrE
i
i 
, the signal yAi (n) received at point A in the 
disk Ei can be expressed as: q
Pri Ei 
yAi (n) = xui (n) + n0(n), (3)α/2 
λAi 
where n0(n) is the Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) 
with zero mean and variance of σ 2. Thus, the instantaneous 
channel capacity can be expressed as: ! 
Pri 
Cri Ei= log2 1 + . (4)Ei λα Ai /σ 2 
We assume that the noise variances σ 2 is normalized to one, 
as otherwise, the noise variance can be absorbed into λAi by 
considering λAi = λAi /σ 2. This implies that the ergodic 
capacity over the cluster Ei can be evaluated by integrat-
ing (4), as follows: !Z REi Z 2π PrEiiC¯Erii = 1 ` log2 1 + dθd`. (5) πR2 λα 0 0Ei Ai 
The above equation can be evaluated for a given set of 
parameters by using standard numerical integration tech-
niques or software. However, in order to further investigate 
the performance of the proposed system, we provide closed 
form solution using an approximation for α = 2 as the 
free space scenario and validate the approximation in the 
simulation section. The approximation of ergodic capacity is 
obtained as: 
1
C¯ri ' Ei R2 ln 2 Ei 











)−(ri + H2 + R2Ei ) 
2 2 2ln(ri + H2 + R2Ei ) + (ri + H2) ln(ri + H2) . 
Similarly, if Pdi−ri denotes the transmission power to serve D 
a user in D, then we can use the same method to calculate 
Cdi−rithe approximated ergodic capacity over D denoted by ¯ ,D 
where, di − ri is the Euclidean distance between the UAV and 
the center of D and di is the distance between the two disks. 
Thus, the cost for a UAV to serve all the users in D such 
Cdi−rithat ¯ ≥ τD, while preserving its service at Ei is equal to: D 
Costi = nEi (Pri − P0 ) + nDPdi−ri , (6)Ei Ei D 
where nEi and nD specify the number users in disk Ei and D, 
respectively. P0Ei is the minimum transmission power required 
for satisfying the QoS requirement at Ei, when UAV is located 
at its center, that is ri = 0. The first term specifies the 
additional cost for serving Ei when the UAV moves towards 
D, such that ri > 0. The second term is equal to the cost of 
serving users at D. From (6), it is apparent to understand that 
when the UAV moves towards D, the value of the first term 
increases while the second term decreases. 
The minimum required transmission power for serving all 
the users in Ei and D can be calculated through the following 
resource allocation model. 
A. RESOURCE ALLOCATION MODEL 




and the optimal value of ri (i.e. optimal location of UAV 
over a line connecting the center of disks Ei and D) to obtain 
the minimum cost of service that satisfies the targeted QoS 
requirement at D, while preserving the QoS for users in Ei as 
follows: 
∗ ∗ r di−r∗ i i[ri , P , P ] = arg min Costi (7)Ei D di−riri,Pri ,PEi D 
C¯di−risubject to D ≥ τD (8) 
C¯ri ≥ τEi , (9)Ei 
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where the objective function (7) represents the service cost 





and the optimal value of Euclidean distance ri. Constraints 
(8) and (9) ensure that the ergodic capacity of users in D 
and Ei is not less than the threshold rate τD and τEi , respec-
tively. The constraints (8) and (9) are non convex in terms of 
their associated transmission power and ri jointly, therefore, 
the optimization problem is non convex. However, both the 
constraints are convex in terms of the power separately. 
Thus, in order to solve (7), both the bisection-based line 
search method and a gradient descent method are employed. 
In particular, the bisection method is used to find a suitable 




and Pdi−ri are calculated through the following convex D 
optimization problem: 
[Pri , Pdi−ri ] = arg min {nEiPri + nDPdi−ri } (10)Ei D Ei D 
P
ri di−ri ,PDEi 
subject to C¯D 
di−ri ≥ τD (11) 
C¯ri ≥ τEi . (12)Ei 
In order to solve (10), Algorithm 1 which is based on 
the gradient descent technique [52], employed for each 
Pdi−ri D and PE
ri
i 
independently to satisfy the related constraint 
(11) and (12), respectively. It converges to the optimal value 
with a specific tolerance  to the constraints. Thus, repeating 
the same procedure for different values of rˆi obtained through 
the bisection method leads to the solution of (7). 
Algorithm 1 Gradient Descent-Based Iterative Method 
1: Notations: x ∈ {Pdi−ri , Pri }, Cz ∈ { C¯di−ri , C¯ri }, and D Ei D Ei 
τz ∈ {τD, τEi }
2: Initializations: choose µ > 0, i = 0, set Error = 1, and 
0initialize x . 
3: Iteration i: 
4: step 1: Evaluate capacity Cz corresponding to xi 
i+15: x = xi + µ × Error 
6: Error = τz − Cz 
7: if |Error| ≤  for a given tolerance  ≥ 0 then terminate, 
otherwise set i = i + 1 and go to step 1 
B. AUCTION FRAMEWORK AND UTILITY FUNCTIONS 
A single round sealed bid reverse auction is organized 
between UAV operators (sellers) offering the network con-
nectivity service and the business agent (buyer) who is inter-
ested in outsourcing the network coverage of users in D. 
We assume that the business agent itself also acts as an 
auctioneer. The main objective is to select a suitable low cost 
UAV that can satisfy users’ demand of QoS as discussed 
in Section IV, with whom the agent would contract for a 
long period of time. At the beginning, before the auction 
process to start, it is assumed that all UAVs are well informed 
about the desired QoS requirement. Each UAV operator at 
first calculates its own cost of service provisioning Ci, such 
that Ci = τ × (Pcosti + Ocosti), where Pcosti is the cost 
due to transmission power obtained from (7), Ocosti is the 
remaining operational cost including the cost of radio fre-
quency bandwidth, and τ represents the service duration. 
The UAV operator then submits a sealed bid bi = Ci 
(in truthful bidding) to the auctioneer. After receiving all the 
sealed bids, the auctioneer will determine a winner and the 
corresponding payment. Thus, the auction mechanism can 
be divided into two phases: (i) Winner determination; and 
(ii) payment allocation, as described below. 
1) WINNER DETERMINATION 
We adopt a reputation based winner determination model 
where the selection of a winning UAV is not only based on its 
bid value but also on its reputation which is developed based 
on users’ past experience, as considered in [53]. According 
to this model a winner is determined as follows: 
∗ a = arg min(bi + HCi), (13)
i 
where HCi represents an unexpected hidden cost associated 
with the operator’s reputation based on past experiences of 
its service provisioning. This implies that if the UAV i wins, 
the business agent may suffer by HCi amount of cost in 
addition to the bid price bi. The cost HCi can be incurred 
because of the inadequate service provisioning as compared 
to the desired QoS. Mathematically, it can be expressed as: 
HCi = (1 − Ri)Cd, (14) 
where Cd is the cost of deviation from the desired service. 
Ri ∈ (0, 1) represents the reputation of the UAV which is 
based on the past experience of ground users, and provides 
a measure of its reliability for future contracts. Thus, (14) 
implies that a UAV with poor reputation may cause high 
hidden cost to the agent. Note that, we assume that the hidden 
costs are only known to the business agent. The reputation 
of UAV can be effectively developed through the feedback 
of distributed monitoring nodes, which will be discussed 
in Section VI. We assume that all the participating UAV 
operators have a history of past performance, and thus have 
been associated to a specific reputation score. 
2) PAYMENT ALLOCATION 
For truthfulness, we adopt the payment rule of Vickery auc-
tion mechanism [18], that is, the winning UAV is awarded by 
the price Pwin equal to the second best bid. Mathematically, 
Pwin can be expressed as: Pwin = min(b−i), where b−i is 
a vector of bids except bi, such that, each element in b−i is 
greater than or equal to bi. Note that, the auction mechanism 
ignores all the bids lower than bi but causing higher hidden 
cost. After both the winner determination and payment allo-
cation process, the auctioneer notifies the winner and shares 
the outcome with all the UAV operators for transparency. The 
utility of the selected UAV operator can be expressed as: 
Us = Pwin − Ci. 
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Similarly the utility of the business agent can be 
calculated as: 
Ub = α1πRD2 (1 − η) − Pwin, 
where πR2 D specifies the desired coverage area, and α1 repre-
sents its unit valuation for the business agent. In addition, η 
represents the percentage commission which the monitoring 
nodes charges the business agent for facilitating the SLA 
compliance monitoring. The key parameters have been sum-
marized in Table 1 for quick reference. 
TABLE 1. Key parameters of the network model. 
Definition 1: Dominant strategy equilibrium is reached 
when each player performs its own optimal action indepen-
dent of the other players’ action. 
Lemma 1: In the proposed auction mechanism bidding 
one’s own cost (bi = Ci) is a weekly dominant action. There-
fore, the auction attains the dominant strategy equilibrium. 
Proof: The proof follows the same line of reasoning as 
that of the Vickery auction mechanism. For example, given 
that, in the proposed auction mechanism the winner is always 
being paid with the second minimum bid, and HC is unknown 
to the bidders, therefore likewise Vickery mechanism, if a 
bidder wins by bidding lower than its cost and someone else’s 
bid, then it will be paid less than its true cost. Thus, it is 
optimal for the bidders to announce their true cost and lose. 
Secondly, a winner with truthful bidding will always be paid 
higher than its cost, independently to its bid value. Therefore, 
it is again optimal to bid truthfully and get benefit, which 
completes the proof.  
V. BLOCKCHAIN PRELIMINARIES 
The blockchain setup and network operations are mainly 
based on three core components: Asymmetric key cryptogra-
phy, digital signature, and consensus mechanism, which are 
described as follows: 
A. ASYMMETRIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY 
Asymmetric key cryptography, also known as public key 
cryptography, is a cryptographic system that uses a pair of 
public key and private key [54]. The public key can be widely 
distributed over all the network, whereas the private key must 
be kept secret. Both the keys can encrypt a message, such that, 
the opposite key from the one used to encrypt the message 
can be used to decrypt it. Blockchain network exploits this 
feature of public key cryptography for secure operation of 
the blockchain. For example, in blockchain, private keys are 
used to digitally sign transactions, which helps to ensure 
authenticity and integrity of messages. 
B. DIGITAL SIGNATURE 
Digital signature is one of the fundamental aspects of guaran-
teeing the security and integrity of data that is recorded in the 
blockchain network [55]. It is mainly based on asymmetric 
cryptography and a mathematical algorithm that creates a 
hash of the input data. For example, in order to create a digital 
signature, one first creates the hash of the data to be signed, 
and then the private key is used to encrypt this hash. Given 
that the value of a hash is always unique to the hashed data, 
therefore, the integrity of the data can be easily verified using 
the signer’s public key to decrypt the encrypted hash value. 
A digital signature also makes it difficult for the signer to 
deny after signing something, assuming that its private key 
is not compromised. Thus, the digital signature enables the 
blockchain to ensure non-repudiation of transactions con-
ducted over the network. 
C. CONSENSUS MECHANISM 
Consensus mechanisms can be defined as the protocols that 
make sure that all the blockchain nodes (that maintain the 
blockchain also known as miners) are synchronized with 
each other and agree on all the legitimate transactions to 
be added in the blockchain [56]. One of the major objec-
tives of consensus mechanism is to stop users from double 
spending [57] or from making fake transactions. Most of the 
blockchains have many features in common and function in 
a similar way, but they can be uniquely characterized based 
on their adopted consensus mechanism. There are various 
types of consensus mechanisms, and some of the well known 
mechanism include: proof of work, proof of stack [58], proof 
of burn [59], and proof of authority [60]. On account of 
permissions, blockchain networks can be categorized into 
two classes: Permissionless blockchains and permissioned 
blockchains [61]. 
D. PERMISSIONLESS BLOCKCHAIN 
Permissionless blockchains are known as public blockchains. 
As the name implies, these networks are completely open 
VOLUME 8, 2020 118225 
A. S. Khan et al.: Trusted UAV Network Coverage 
FIGURE 3. Proposed blockchain infrastructure. 
such that anyone can join and participate as a blockchain node 
(known as miner) to serve the network and seek a reward. 
In addition, a miner can leave and join a network as a node at 
its will. Bitcoin and Ethereum [27] are the most well known 
examples of public blockchains. Public blockchains are com-
pletely decentralized in nature, where control is distributed 
over the entire network. More importantly, being honest is in 
everyone’s best interest in public blockchains, and malicious 
participants would suffer from high cost if they were to 
cheat. However, there are many drawbacks in adopting the 
public blockchain for real time applications. For example, 
they are less efficient in terms of speed, energy and scalability, 
and require a large number of nodes to ensure security and 
immutability [62]. 
E. PERMISSIONED BLOCKCHAIN 
Permissioned blockchains can be referred to as private 
blockchain, e.g., Hyperledger. These blockchains permit 
only authorized entities to participate in a close network. 
For example, a consortium of members in a permissioned 
blockchain decides who can join the network and who can 
serve the network by writing new blocks into the chain. 
Private blockchains are usually designed for specific features. 
They are much faster than public blockchains and can process 
thousands or even hundreds of thousands of transactions 
per second. In addition, they are more customizable and have 
high scalability and energy efficiency benefits. However, 
since the number of participants in these systems is lower 
than that of the public blockchains, they are more centralized 
in nature and semi-reliable [63]. The well known examples 
of private blockchains include Ripple, Hyperledger [64], and 
Consortium blockchain. Private blockchains follow different 
consensus mechanism compared to the public blockchains. 
Most commonly used consensus mechanisms are: Proof of 
Authority [60], Proof of elapsed time, Proof of Importance, 
and Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance [65]. 
VI. PROPOSED BLOCKCHAIN FRAMEWORK 
A. BLOCKCHAIN BASED INFRASTRUCTURE 
We exploit the Hyperledger fabric framework [64] to propose 
a private blockchain architecture for our application, com-
prising three different types of nodes including: monitoring 
nodes, endorsers and orderer, as shown in Fig. 3. Both the 
UAV operator and the business agent interact as clients to the 
blockchain. Monitoring nodes are the subset of users within 
the private blockchain who monitor the data rate offered by 
the UAV through invoking a monitoring contract. In our work, 
we use the received signal power at the monitoring terminal 
for quantifying the data rate. Similarly, the endorsers are a 
subset of the blockchain network users excluding the moni-
tors, who is responsible for analyzing the measured data and 
for making a verdict about the QoS. Additionally, endorsers 
contain digital ledger for blockchain storage. The orderer is a 
member of the blockchain network, who is however not part 
of the monitors or endorsers, and is responsible for gener-
ating a block of transactions. As customarily, each element 
is authorized by membership service provider to partake in 
the network, and has been assigned a unique digital identity 
through a certificate authority. In addition, each node is given 
a separate role to play. For instance, once the service con-
tract begins and the UAV submits a transaction for notifying 
the quality of its service delivery during the contract, all 
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the monitoring nodes measure the quality of network con-
nectivity periodically. Through peer-to-peer communication, 
these measured values are then forwarded to endorsers as 
transactions. 
These transactions will not be updated in the ledger as 
they are only for the endorsers for estimating the service 
quality and endorsing in support or against the UAV claim 
about the QoS delivery. Each endorser after validating the 
incoming transactions from the monitoring nodes, employs 
a machine learning technique to evaluate the level of QoS 
provisioning, as discussed in Section VI-C. After evaluation 
of the QoS, each endorser shares its decision to the orderer. 
Please note that, not all the endorsers will have measure-
ments from all of the monitoring nodes, due to geographi-
cally distributed locations of the monitoring nodes as well 
as the endorsers and their non-homogeneous channel con-
ditions. Hence, each endorser may make its decision based 
on possibly non-identical measurements. The orderer based 
on the Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) consensus 
mechanism [66] makes a final decision about the quality of 
received service, and generates a block of transactions (as a 
service log), which will be broadcasted to all the endorsers to 
update their ledger. At this stage, the endorsers will verify if 
the decision made and recorded by the orderer is consistent 
with its own decision before updating their ledger. Note that, 
in order to avoid a single point of failure and thus to support a 
distributed ordering mechanism, the orderer can be replaced 
with multiple orderers as proposed in [67]. Since, we consider 
the Fabric platform for our proposed work, the block size and 
other necessary parameters in the blockchain are assumed to 
be set to their default values. 
Smart contract contains a set of rules under which the 
parties are required to interact with each other. In addition, 
the smart contract facilitates, verifies and enforces the perfor-
mance of an agreement. Note that, all the blockchain nodes 
are registered to the same channel and hosting a group of all 
the relevant smart contracts (chaincode), that can be queried 
and updated by the blockchain application as shown in Fig. 3. 
The proposed framework is mainly based on four different 
smart contracts that are installed in the monitoring nodes, 
given as: 
1) SLA contract: articulates a set of rules agreed by both 
the UAV operator and the business agent, and concerns 
about monitoring, obligations, prohibitions, and the 
duration of service. 
2) Monitoring contract: aims for autonomous and periodic 
monitoring of QoS provisioning. 
3) Billing contract: evaluates the payment and the penalty 
based on QoS provisioning and SLA violations, and 
bills the business agent to pay as per agreement. 
4) Reputation contract: evaluates the service provider’s 
reputation based on SLA violations, which at the end 
of the service contract will be sent to the business agent 
for future agreements through auctioning as discussed 
in section IV. 
We assume that both the UAV operator and the business 
agent are also a part of the Ethereum network containing 
an Ethereum wallet, therefore instead of introducing a new 
digital currency for our framework, all the payments will be 
made in ether. This also enables the network to change the 
world state of their assets in Ethereum blockchain. Finally, 
the channel is a private subnet of communication between 
specific network members that join the channel, for the pur-
pose of conducting private and secure transactions. Note that, 
a smart contract installed in the peers can only be instantiated 
by the channel members. 
B. SERVICE LEVEL AGREEMENT CONTRACT 
Once the business agent subscribes the UAV service with cer-
tain terms and conditions offered by the UAV operator, a con-
tract is created between the two parties, which is deployed 
as a smart contract in the blockchain framework. This smart 
contract can be invoked on the read-only basis as a reference 
to contractual terms. However, a change in the contract can 
only be possible in layer 1 and with the consent of both 
the trading parties. The SLA contract is mainly based on 
four components including: participant, the service descrip-
tion, service duration, obligations, payment and penalty. The 
participant identifies the contractual parties including their 
names, network address and public keys. The service descrip-
tion specifies the QoS and its observable parameters, such as, 
coverage area, response time, ergodic capacity or throughput. 
The service duration is the time interval over which the SLA 
is assumed to be valid. The service obligations define some 
constraints that may be imposed on SLA parameters. The 
payment and penalty element ( i.e., last element of SLA) 
defines the payment rules, currency, and the regulation of 
penalty in case of any violation. The SLA template for net-
work connectivity service is shown in Table 2. 
TABLE 2. SLA template for network connectivity. 
C. REAL TIME MONITORING PROTOCOL 
This protocol allows real-time periodic monitoring of QoS 
provisioning at the coverage area. Note that, a QoS violation 
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FIGURE 4. Flow diagram of QoS monitoring. 
is considered if the ergodic capacity (determined through the 
estimate of SNR) of the link connecting the UAV and 
the ground user at any point in the coverage area is less than 
the threshold rate τD, as discussed in Section II. In order 
to determine if the level of QoS provisioning is satisfied, 
a one-class support vector machine (SVM) is employed. 
For this purpose, distributed monitoring nodes are appointed 
over the coverage area for periodic measurement of instan-
taneous channel capacity of network connectivity. Note that, 
we assume that all the monitoring nodes have perfectly syn-
chronized clocks, such that, they perform measurement at 
the same time over some constant periodic interval. The 
SVM is then employed over the measured values to detect 
the breach of satisfactory QoS as an anomaly. Note that we 
have employed one-class SVM because of its simplicity, low 
complexity and robust performance [68]. The flow diagram 
of the monitoring protocol is shown in Fig. 4. The proto-
col is mainly based on two stages: (i) training stage and 
(ii) monitoring stage. 
1) TRAINING STAGE 
The training stage is organized in a convenient time duration 
well before the initiation of a series of actual contractual ser-
vices. During this stage, a trusted training UAV is temporarily 
deployed for network connectivity, such that, it transmits pilot 
signals with power greater than or equal to the power needed 
to satisfy the target data rate τD, as discussed in Section IV. 
Meanwhile, corresponding to each pilot transmission, instan-
taneous ergodic capacity values are computed based on the 
received signal power measured over all n monitoring nodes. 
These measurements are then represented by an n dimen-
sional vector xi ∈ Rn for i = 1, 2, . . . , m, where m is 
the number of training instances. At each training instance, 
the training UAV will transmit signals with a power level that 
is drawn according to a uniform random distribution between 
minimum required power level for attaining desired QoS 
and a maximum power limit. Thus, for m training instances, 
training data {x1, x2 . . . , xm} is constructed, such that, each 
element xi is labeled with normal-service class. The training 
data with its class label is then used as input to a one-class 
SVM. Traditionally, the SVM first maps the training data 
into high dimensional feature space and then determines the 
maximal margin hyperplane that best separates the training 
data from the origin. This can be obtained by solving the 
following optimization problem [69]:  n X||w||2 1
min − ρ + i 
w,,ρ 2 vn 
i=1 
subject to: wT φ(xi) ≥ ρ − i, i ≥ 0, (15) 
where φ(xi) is a kernel function which projects the data into 
a high dimensional feature space [70], i are slack variables 
introduced to relax the constraint in certain cases for some 
training data sets. In addition, ρ ≥ 0 characterizes the 
hyperplane that has maximum distance from the origin in 
the feature space, and v ∈ {0, 1} controls the tradeoff between 
the number of data points contained by the hyperplane and the 
maximum distance between the hyperplane and the origin. 
After solving the optimization problem, the following deci-
sion function f (x) is employed to identify the class of input 
data x [69]: 
f (x) = sign(wT .φ(x) − ρ). (16) 
This decision function is used during the monitoring stage to 
identify the class of real time monitoring data x. For example, 
x will be identified as normal-service class if f (x) > 0, 
otherwise it will be detected as violated-service. We note that 
the theoretical minimum power for satisfying the target data 
rate may differ slightly in practice due to reasons such as 
weather condition etc. Hence to allow a possible margin of 
error ρ should be set to ρ − 0 for an appropriate positive 
small constant 0 chosen carefully based on the experience. 
Thus, the resulting outcome of training unit dtrain composed 
of vector w and ρ along with their hash values are distributed 
to all the endorsers for QoS identification during the actual 
service time. It can be expressed as: 
dtrain = (w||ρ||H(w||ρ)), 
where H(:) is a hash function employing the SHA256 algo-
rithm as discussed, and || denotes concatenation operation. 
2) MONITORING STAGE 
The monitoring stage of the protocol begins (i.e., during 
the actual service contract) when the selected UAV starts 
delivering its service and makes a transaction to notify about 
its transmission power (PUAV). During this stage each mon-
itoring node triggers the monitoring contract (as presented) 
for periodic measurement (over the time period Tmonitor) 
of the instantaneous channel capacity, and for sharing with 
endorsers. The contract is composed of different functions. 
For example, the function DataAcquisition() acquires the 
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value of the received signal strength through measurement 
service (e.g. using a sensor), and evaluates the instantaneous 
capacity c˜i through processing unit. This measured value 
is signed by the monitoring node’s private key skmi , and is 
then transmitted towards the endorsers as a transaction Tmi 
using the SubmitMeasurement() function and through peer-
to-peer communication. It is important to note that, each 
monitoring node can only submit a single transaction using 
its private key, represented as: 
Tmi = Encskmi (PUAV||c˜i||Time||H(PUAV||c˜i||Time)), (17) 
where Encskmi (:) represents an asymmetric key encryption 
algorithm. Each endorser after receiving the transactions first 
verifies all the transactions using asymmetric key decryption 
algorithm Decpkmi (:) (through public keys pkmi ), and then 
recovers the measurements x˜i = {c˜1, c˜2, . . . , c˜n} of all the 
monitoring nodes. Afterward, it employes (16) on x˜i to iden-
tify the class of the QoS provisioning using the training values 
of w and ρ, and shares the outcome with the orderer as its 
endorsement in support or against the UAV claim of service 
provisioning. Note that, likewise (17), the endorsers will 
sign the transactions to the orderer using their private keys. 
The orderer after collecting all the endorsements employs 
the PBFT consensus mechanism to make a final decision 
on whether the SLA is satisfied or violated. In addition, 
the orderer stacks together all the incoming transactions and 
FIGURE 5. Blockchain of service log. 
generates a block (as a service log), which also contains 
the final decision about the SLA provisioning. This block is 
then timestamped and published (along with its hash value) 
in the network as a new block to the chain of service log, 
as shown in Fig. 5, while all the endorsers verify this block 
and store into their service ledger. Thus, a block generation 
process takes in total Tmonitor + ξ amount of time, where ξ 
represents some constant amount of time delay occurring dur-
ing peer-to-peer communication and transactions verification 
process. It is important to note that, likewise conventional 
bitcoin mechanism, each block is linked to the previous block 
through a hash pointer. 
D. PAYMENT 
The transfer of payment from the business agent’s account 
to the UAV operator is automatically performed through the 
Billing contract. This contract is instantiated at the end of 
service time. The contract first calculates the penalty on QoS 
violations that must be paid by the UAV operator according 
to pre-defined terms in SLA, and then evaluates the payment 
which the business agent is required to pay to the UAV 
operator. Note that, the contract can access the Ethereum 
wallets of both the entities. Therefore, it automatically credits 
the payment from one’s account to another. The contract is 
mainly based on three functions, as shown. 
The function PenaltyEvaluation() pulls the service log 
and simply counts the number of violations over the entire 
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service duration, and evaluates the violation penalty using an 
exponential expressions, as follows: 
NI − no.violationsPenalty = exp(− ) × Pwin, no.violations 
where NI specifies the total number of monitoring intervals 
throughout the service duration, no.violations represents the 
number of violations, and Pwin is the payment obtained 
through auctioning as discussed in Section IV, which is the 
payment under no violation. After evaluating the penalty 
of service violations, the contract calls the SendPayment() 
function which directly credits the payment below to the 
UAV operator through the business agent’s wallet using its 
private key, 
Payment = Pwin − Penalty. 
E. REPUTATION 
The reputation of service provider is mainly based on the QoS 
provisioning during the entire service time. It is evaluated 
using the Reputation contract, as presented. After evaluat-
ing the reputation, the contract stores the information in the 
blockchain and also shares it with the business agent to take 
into account the trustworthiness of UAV operator for future 
interactions. Intuitively, the rating of the service provider 
is actually reflecting its reliability and certainty for service 
provisioning. In order to evaluate the reputation of the serving 
UAV operator, the contract invokes EvaluateReputation() 
function. This function first accesses the entire blockchain of 
service log to take into account all the time instances n ≤ NI 
at which the QoS violation has occurred, and then assigns 
normalized weight wn to the violation instances correspond-
ing to the total number of monitoring intervals NI, such that PNI 
n=1 wn = 1. Based on the QoS provisioning, the service 
reputation can be evaluated as: 
NIX 
Ri = 1 − wnδn, (18) 
n=1 
where δn is an indicator function such that it is equal to 1 at 
time instance n when QoS violation happens, and 0 otherwise. 
At the beginning of service time, because of the operational 
adjustment, the UAV may provide bad service such that QoS 
violations can be observed. Therefore in order to ignore 
violation instances at the beginning of service, the normalized 
coefficients wn are set such that the violations in the distance 
past have smaller weights according to an exponential forget-
ting model [71] given as: 
exp{λ(n − NI)}wn = PNI , 
n=1 exp{λ(n − NI)} 
where λ is a scaling factor. Thus, the reputation of the service 
provider for the future contract can be aggregated as: 
Ri+1 = Ri−1 + κ(Ri − Ri−1), 
where Ri−1 represents the reputation score during the past 
experience, and 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1 is a small constant value. 
The resultant reputation score along with its hash value is 
digitally signed and shared with the business agent through 
the function ShareReputation(). 
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS 
This section provides three kinds of results for the eval-
uation of the performance. At first, simulation results are 
presented to verify the tightness of the derived theoretical 
approximations for the ergodic capacity that has been pre-
sented in Section IV. Then the robustness of the considered 
SVM model is evaluated in terms of the probability of true 
classification and the probability of false alarm as a function 
of the number of monitoring nodes. Finally, the performance 
of the proposed auction mechanism along with the blockchain 
enabled reputation system is presented. All the results pre-
sented in this sections are obtained through a MATLAB sim-
ulation platform, while considering the necessary parameters 
of the blockchain have been set to their default values. 
For simulation settings, we consider that all the monitoring 
nodes and the endorsers are located randomly over the cover-
age area. The other key parameters are provided in Table 3. 
TABLE 3. Parameter values for simulation. 
Fig. 6 exhibits the agreement between simulation and ana-
Cdi−rilytical results for C¯ri (denoted by ¯ ) and ¯ (denotedEi CEi d ¯by Cd), which confirms the tightness of our derived theo-
retical approximations. For a constant transmission power, 
the figure also illustrates the effect of UAV position (reflected 
by ri) over the ergodic capacity values. As expected, with 
the increase of ri that is when the UAV moves from disk 
Ei towards D, the ergodic capacity CEi reduces while CD ¯
increases. 
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FIGURE 6. Comparison between simulation and theoretical results for 
di −ri riergodic capacity as a function of ri , when P = P = −77.12dBm. D Ei 
To evaluate performance of the one-class SVM, a Monte 
Carlo simulation platform was developed. Instantaneous 
capacity values were calculated using the estimate of SNR 
over the random locations in disk D, while considering 
300 random instances of transmissions with power equal 
to or greater than the required power level for the QoS sat-
isfaction. Furthermore, during the true service provisioning, 
all the instances were counted when the QoS requirement 
over D was satisfied, and averaged over 104 realizations 
to compute the probability of true classification of service. 
Similarly, the probability of false alarm was calculated during 
the incorrect service provisioning. Note that, we employed 
Gaussian Radial Base function as kernel function for SVM, 
and set 0.05 outlier fraction in the training data. 
FIGURE 7. Classification of UAV service provisioning using one class SVM, 
when only two monitoring nodes are considered. 
Fig. 7 exhibits the training data description learned by 
the considered SVM model, obtained through two randomly 
located monitoring nodes. In addition, it shows the behavior 
of SVM against the monitoring data that is collected over 
the monitoring stage of UAV service. For the SVM training, 
we consider the transmit power range between −50dBm to 
30dBm for τD = 15. It can be seen that all the training 
FIGURE 8. Effect of the number of monitoring nodes on the probability of 
true classification versus the probability of false alarm. 
instances belong to the normal service class except 5% of 
them which are predicted as outage-service class and referred 
to as outliers (as expected). The robustness of the SVM is 
exhibited in Fig. 8 in terms of the receiver operating char-
acteristics (ROC), i.e., probability of true classification PT 
versus the probability of false alarm PF. Clearly, exponential 
increase of PT can be noticed for a small change in the prob-
ability of false alarm PF . Moreover, the figure demonstrates 
that this performance is further improved by increasing the 
number of monitoring nodes. 
Fig. 9 studies the performance of the proposed feedback-
based reputation (referred as FBR) system in terms of the 
average cost (costAverage which includes the payment Pwin 
and the hidden cost HC) of service versus the probability 
FIGURE 9. Performance comparison between the proposed 
blockchain-enabled FBR system and NFBR and NR systems in terms of 
the total service cost as a function of certainty, when the number of 
monitoring nodes is 10, κ = 0.5, and nu = 50 (number of UAV operators). 
of certainty (denoted by Pcertainty) that the selected UAV 
will serve the users in D according to its reputation score. 
For simulation purposes, we considered up to 20% deviation 
(both positive and negative) in UAV service provisioning. 
Initially, we randomly assign reputation scores to participat-
ing UAV operators and run our experiment for 103 iterations 
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FIGURE 10. Percentage efficiency of blockchain-enabled FBR, NFBR and 
NR systems as a function of probability of certainty, when the number of 
monitoring nodes is 10, κ = 0.5, and nu = 50. 
for the development of fair reputation of each UAV accord-
ing to its service history. The performance is compared 
with no-feedback-based reputation (referred as NFBR) sys-
tem (i,e., considering constant reputation score), and with 
no-reputation (referred as NR) system. Clearly, the pro-
posed FBR system outperforms both the NFBR and NR 
systems. Moreover, it is important to note that the cost of 
service reduces significantly with the increase of probabil-
ity of certainty Pcertainty. In addition, the performance gap 
between FBR and NR also increases with Pcertainty, which 
gives rise to the intuition for the need for the autonomous 
and truthful reputation system. On the other hand, Fig. 10 
compares the percentage efficiency of the three systems, 
where the efficiency of system is evaluated as: Efficiency = 
CostAverage−Penalty ×100. The figure demonstrates that based on CostAverage 
the value of Pcertainty, using FBR system the efficiency of NR 
system and NFBR systems can be improved to 2.5−20% and 
2.5 − 11%, respectively, which further strengthen the results 
of Fig. 9. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
This paper proposed an auction mechanism that jointly 
addresses the economic aspect of UAV-based network cov-
erage and the mitigation of adverse selection of service 
providers. Using a theoretical analysis, we have shown that 
truthful bidding is the only weakly dominant strategy in 
the auction. To aid submission of appropriate bids for the 
service provision by UAV operators, we have determined 
the cost in terms of transmission power for serving users 
that are distributed according to BPP in a geographical area. 
Simulation results confirmed the tightness of the derived ana-
lytical approximations. Moreover, we proposed a framework 
which integrates the benefits of SVM and smart contract 
features of blockchain for distributed and periodic monitoring 
of quality of UAV service and SLA enforcement. In addi-
tion, based on the UAV service, the proposed framework 
quantifies the UAV reputation which is then shared privately 
through blockchain for future interactions. Through simula-
tions, we have investigated the robustness of the SVM and 
the potential improvement by increasing the number of mon-
itoring nodes. Furthermore, we demonstrated that a superior 
performance in terms of average cost and efficiency of service 
provisioning can always be achieved through the FBR system 
as compared to both the NR and NFBR systems. 
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